If at first you don’t succeed, try, try, try again.

Neville Chamberlain, September 1938

Disclaimer: Everything mentioned and stated here are my own personal opinion and this blog serves as a record for me to store and share my thoughts

Neville Chamberlain.

So many disappointed sighs and disgruntled shake of the heads follow at the mention of this name. This man, Chamberlain, has been portrayed by many, as the embodiment of a grand political failure. What else could they say? He could not stop the war, he appeased and sucked up to the dictators in the 1930s, he made Great Britain a laughing stock to continental Europe and most pathetically, he was criticized by his successor, Winston Churchill. Chamberlain’s career narrative seemed more like a political charade rather than a legacy.

But really? Does he really deserve all this shitshow? There are a lot of things we have to consider before taking a skewed opinion of this poor man. Let’s start with who he actually is.

To the layman, Neville Chamberlain was simply once the Prime Minister of Britain. Chamberlain served in the premiership from May 1937 to May 1940, in the most unfortunate period after the Great War (AKA First World War), DURING the Great Depression. A country in shambles was handed to him and he was expected to nurse Britain back to health and prosperity. Following Stanley Baldwin’s footsteps, Chamberlain continued the policy of appeasement with as much, if not more tenacity. Chamberlain’s Britain was in a state of economic depression, devastated from the loss of lives in WW1, with no appetite for another war with the Germans. No one was in a much worse situation than Neville Chamberlain himself. 

In May 1937, after getting into office, Neville Chamberlain actively pursued the policy of appeasement to tame the dictators in Europe. There were concerns that the Treaty of Versailles was too harsh and the League of Nations (LON) being too inefficient. Many made obvious their grievances and discontent, some more aggressive. In late autumn 1935, Benito Mussolini of Italy, with the aim to boost Italian national prestige, which was wounded by Ethiopia’s defeat of Italian forces in 1896, invaded Ethiopia. Although this issue was hotly mediated by the LON via economic sanctions, their efforts were in vain as Mussolini barely blinked in response to the threats the LON weakly retaliated with. This historical event is synonymously marked as the British government’s first act of appeasement when the League failed to resolve the Abyssinian Crisis, as shared by Neville Chamberlain in his speech to the 1900 club, a club of wealthy and influential people in Britain:

“But if the League be, limited in that sort of way it must be admitted that it could no longer be relied upon by itself to secure the peace of the world.” ^[1]

And more appeasement followed. The Treaty of Versailles was a punishment to the Germans for starting the WW1 and for causing massive losses to her neighbouring countries. Hitler resented the agreement, not understanding why they had to cede land to lesser nations. Germany suffered significant territorial losses in the East and West and they were forced to demilitarise Rhineland as a measure to prevent future invasion into Belgium and France. National pride wounded, the German people looked to Hitler as the dictator promises to take back lost lands to restore national prestige. On 7 March 1936, Hitler delivered on his promises when the German military forces entered the Rhineland. The Allies did nothing in response and did so once again when Hitler annexed Austria on 12 March 1938 as they felt that the Austrians probably wanted to join the Germans and hence technically, they weren’t being forced. With Austria now in German hands, Hitler made known of his plans to incorporate areas of Czechoslovakia into the German sphere of military presence. Although greatly alarmed, the Allies still choose to avoid conflict and did nothing.

This is where Neville Chamberlain comes in.

Neville Chamberlain, at that time, was the Prime Minister of Britain. Of course, he had to attempt some course of actions. In September 1938, Neville Chamberlain personally flew down to Germany to attempt to dissuade Hitler from invading Czechoslovakia. Long an admirer of Great Britain, Hitler was flattered and wanted to make an ally out of them. He agreed to take no military action without further discussion. ^[2] During the negotiation, Chamberlain made concessions by promising to attempt convincing his cabinet and the French to accept the plebiscite outcome in the German-speaking Sudetenland. On September 22, Chamberlain met Hitler again at Godesberg, where Hitler made more demanding requests: he now wanted Sudetenland occupied by the German army and the Czechs evacuated from the area. Disgruntled, Chamberlain submitted the new agreement to the British cabinet, the French and the Czechs. All of them rejected it. On the 24th, the French had launched a partial mobilisation with the Czechs ordering a general mobilisation one day earlier. In a last-ditch effort to avoid another large-scale war, Chamberlain then proposed a four-power conference be convened immediately to settle the dispute. Hitler agreed and on September 29, 1938, Hitler, Chamberlain, French’s Daladier and Italy’s Mussolini met in Munich, where Mussolini proposed a written agreement known as the Munich Agreement. Before leaving Munich, Hitler and Chamberlain had signed a separate paper declaring their mutual desire to not attack each other and to resolve their differences through negotiations. Both Daladier and Chamberlain returned home to jubilant cheers.

Chamberlain took the paper, waved it to the public and said:

“I used to repeat: If at first you don’t succeed, try, try, try again. That’s what I’m doing. This morning, I had another talk with the German chancellor, Herr Hitler. And here is the paper which bears his name upon it, as well as mine.”

He talked about peace in our time.

“We regard the agreement signed last night, and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again.”

On 1 September 1939, Hitler invaded Poland after the rest of Czechoslovakia. Two days later, Britain and France declared war on Germany. WW2 began.

But where did it all go wrong?

Many blame Chamberlain. And they’re not wrong. But they’re not all right either.

David Dutton, a professor of political history at Liverpool University and author of ‘Reputations: Neville Chamberlain’, mentioned that Chamberlain was duped into thinking that Hitler was a man of reason, able to be trusted to keep his statements made in agreements. ^[3] Chamberlain was thought to regard the German Chancellor as a normal conventional man whose words can be trusted. Munich apparently appalled MI5, who were well-informed and knew that Hitler’s greed knew no boundaries. Sir Richard Evans, Regius Professor of History and President of Wolfson College, Cambridge University adds that they tried to send Chamberlain intelligence reports regarding Hitler and his private, deep-seated resentment towards Chamberlain. ^[4] In their eyes, naivety was Chamberlain’s fault.

But in truth, did anyone think that Chamberlain did not consider the reservations of others when he conceded to Hitler’s demands? Of course he did. Chamberlain was all too aware of the ramifications of negotiating with a dictator and knew that it involved immense moral compromises. He never once thought of Hitler as a decent human being and knew Hitler as a ‘psychopath’ and a ‘gangster’. Likewise, Hitler also detested Chamberlain. Not only did Chamberlain prevent him from going to war at the most perfect time, Hitler was also stripped of the opportunity to gain an important ground that would have determined a swift German victory in the second world war. Unbeknownst to many, Chamberlain had sacrificed his own reputation and moral principles so that the agreement would serve its purpose. Like what Robert Harris said, the Munich agreement set the directions in dealing with Hitler’s war. ^[5] Chamberlain thought that if he made a big deal and waved the agreement in front of people, it would make Hitler hold true to his promises. Hitler of course did not, but this convinced people that Hitler was not a man of his words and that there was no other way to remove him from power other than through war. 

To Hitler, the Munich agreement was a major setback as he wanted to completely wipe off Czechoslovakia but got distracted by Chamberlain’s offer to negotiate personally. This was a blunder as concerns raised by Chamberlain (mistreatment of German minorities in Sudetenland) could be settled if Britain and France placed appropriate pressure on the Czech government. So he was obliged to consent to Chamberlain because he could not go to war over the technical issues in Sudetenland, as advised by Goebbels, his propaganda minister. ^[5] In many ways, Chamberlain’s naivety to deal with Hitler tapped into Hitler’s insecurities and made Hitler give in to negotiating at the Munich Agreement. This left the Allies with opportunities to prepare for war with Germany.

In war-weary Britain, Neville Chamberlain was also careful to consider the feelings and thoughts of his countrymen as like him, most of his generation were scarred by the damages and experience from the First World War. The reception of Chamberlain at the Heston Airport from the Munich Conference was a manifestation of the public views against another war. Andrew Boxer also tells us that many people in Britain were anxious to avoid war and actively supported the policy of appeasement. From the Agreement till 3 September 1939 when Britain and France declared war on Germany, Chamberlain built up and nurtured national pride and unity among the Britains. This overwhelming national pride was used by Churchill and was what drove the Allies through the war. Having Great Britain confident in the war greatly affected the morale of other European countries and had a positive effect on the soldiers fighting the war. If Chamberlain had not continued with the Policy of Appeasement by championing the Munich Agreement, there would only be resentment and confusion as British troops prepare for battle ill-equipped and untrained when war is declared in 1938 instead of one year later.

In one statement made by Sir Richard Evans, Regius Professor of History and President of Wolfson College in Cambridge University, he mentioned that conspiracy plans of German officials against Hitler had reached an advanced stage when the Munich Agreement pulled the rug from underneath the conspirators’ feet. Evans shared that there was a staff around Hitler who always carried a revolver with him should an opportunity rise to shoot Hitler. Interestingly, the staff planned to arrest Hitler if he started the war because it was common sense that Germany was not yet ready to fight another war with Britain and France, following that negotiations would ensue. They were stopped in their tracks by Neville Chamberlain.

Although an intriguing inclusion in this topic, it lacks relevance and is unarguably inconsequential. To add on, German opposition even told Britain of their plans. Chamberlain could not possibly changed his mind based on this and quietly follow along on this hush-hush assassination attempt. Fast forward to after the war, when asked about resistance movements, former German commander-in-chief, Walther von Brauchitsch, disbelieving what he was told, replied his fellow POW that he could not possibly turn his back on the most popular man in Germany. He shared that the German army and public felt that as long as Hitler was successful, they would be loyal to him. Any serious rebellious movements against him only began in July 1944 when Germany faced imminent defeat.^[5] There was no effect on the war, tangible or not and (excuse me for saying) Hitler faced many (and I mean MANY) assassination attempts but escaped unscathed every single damn time. Certainly, Chamberlain cannot be blamed for his Munich plans on the account that he pressed the brakes on the local resistance plans in Germany.

Chamberlain has also been criticised heavily for his blind prejudice towards the USSR and his lacklustre support for the French. His failure to secure an alliance proved detrimental to the war when the Soviets signed a non-aggression, neutrality pact with the Nazis in 1939 because now, Germany could focus his battle on the West without worrying about eastern retaliation, although this did proved futile in the later periods. His belief was that encircling Germany by a potential Anglo-Soviet pact may actually provoke rather than deter conflict. And he personally had not given up on appeasement. Initial high regard for him eroded as a consequence of this and Chamberlain was viewed as a selfish politician, seeking only what he deemed beneficial.

Failing to take into account other perspectives, this view by traditionalists magnifies on Chamberlain’s supposed incapability rather than the grounds accompanying it. Chamberlain was aware of the unlikeliness of creating another Grand Alliance or coalition force against Kaiser’s Germany; Only France was clearly on board, and of her military capacity, Chamberlain was deeply skeptical, with good reason.^[3] Robert Harris also mentioned that on paper, it looked like the French army had good prospects in beating Germany but Chamberlain knew better than to rely on France’s conscripted army. ^[5]

On the Soviet side, Chamberlain had reasonable reservations against an alliance with Stalin. During this period, in 1938, Stalin was enforcing huge purges in the Red Army and more particularly, the destruction of the Soviet High Command planted seeds of doubt in Chamberlain on Red Army’s military credibility. Internal strife does not make one a good opponent in a battle. Unfortunately for both Stalin and Chamberlain, there was also the issue of trust. With eyes set only on consolidating his supreme authority, Stalin was too preoccupied with his internal affairs and would only pursue affiliations that would benefit him. Stalin knew that longer period of rearmament and economic resuscitation were in the books when he signed the Nazi-Soviet pact. Glyn Stone, Professor of International History at the University of West of England supports, stating that if France and Britain were to engage in a long-drawn war with Germany, Stalin would still be able to retain his borders and the war would leave the USSR in a stronger position to dictate the future of Europe.^[4] It was an easy choice for Stalin to make: ally with Britain and France and go to war with Germany or side with Hitler and have half of Poland without going to war. Of course, Stalin was taken aback and infuriated when Hitler went back on his words, invading the Soviet land.

All told, Chamberlain could not risk going into war with a distracted Red Army and a second-rate French support. Although Great Britain possessed one of the most powerful military force then, it was not sufficient to shoulder the burdens of the French and the Soviets. Great Britain would have been annihilated within months, especially when the Germans were aiming at swift battles and surprise attacks. No decision could ever be perfect but Chamberlain’s choice to keep the Soviets and French at bay was a wise one at a time of region-wide political and military instability. Munich had allowed time for realignment of priorities for the Allies.

Many can state the most important justification for the Munich agreement and Chamberlain’s undying grit for appeasement but very few are well-acquainted with the details and how far-reaching its impact was on the delayed war. Heedful of the Treasury and the military unpreparedness of the Britain army, navy and airforce, Neville Chamberlain had to acquiesce to Hitler’s demands. Chamberlain knew Britain was not ready for another war with Germany as the Great War had demolished Britain’s economy. Coupled with Great Depression woes, the massive loss of lives and the struggling recovery of the military, Britain could not survive another war, let alone win one.

Chamberlain himself said that he would not contemplate war ‘unless we had reasonable prospect of being able to beat her (Germany) to her knees in a reasonable time, and of that I see no sign’.

According to David Dilks, leading revisionist historian of Chamberlain, “the buying of time remained a strong element in British foreign policy, as it has been for several years… and to accelerate British rearmament, the spending upon which was moving swiftly forward in 1938 and 1939 and which far exceeded any expenditure upon arms ever undertaken in peacetime.” Evidence shows that between that period, expenditure on arms increased in Britain and France. According to Postan, Expenditure on naval supplies and equipment in the five financial years ending March 1939 was over £240 millions; more than eighty-five percent, went to new construction or to the modernisation and equipment of naval vessels. Budgetary allocations for army equipment also rose from about £6.9 millions in the year ending March 1934 to over £8.5 millions in the following year and to over £67.5 millions in the year ending March 1939, and actual provision of new equipment grew in roughly the same proportion. ^[6] Because of Chamberlain, Britain gained plenty of time for rearmament and Churchill was able to tap into these extra production to attain a long-drawn victory for the Allies. 

In the war, the Germans had speed and the element of surprise. But they did not have the likes of the Dowding system (Britain’s radar interference system) or a fighter aircraft that was anywhere near the power of the British Supermarine Spitfires. Spitfire was the only British fighter produced continuously throughout the war and Germany’s combination of the Luftwaffe and Stukas could not compare. ^[7] It was the Supermarine Spitfires that was able to break German air superiority to allow the famous rescue and evacuation operation at Dunkirk. In the Battle of Britain, Dowding system, a fully coordinated air defense network, allowed the British Air Force to detect and intercept attacks from the Germans; it was like as if Britain knew they were coming and now the element of surprise was no longer Germany’s strength. Because of that, unfortunately for Germany, the losses on Eagle Day amounted to something that was rather chastening for the Luftwaffe. Stephen Bungay, author of The Most Dangerous Enemy and A History of the Battle of Britain, explains that the German dive bombers and fighter aircraft, which had appeared to be invincible in defeating France, were in fact, extremely vulnerable when subjected to the attentions of coherent fighter defense. ^[8]

On the role of radar and Dowding system in the war, even Winston Churchill commended and acknowledged the effort of Chamberlain’s cabinet. ^[9]

“All the ascendancy of the Hurricanes and Spitfires would have been fruitless but for this system which had been devised and built before the war. It had been shaped and refined in constant action, and all was now fused together into a most elaborate instrument of war, the like of which existed nowhere in the world.” 

Armed with both high-end equipment that was exponentially produced during Chamberlain’s hold of office, Britain was able to combat effectively with the Germans, extending the war, to the dismay of Hitler. It was well-known that Hitler was all-in for a quick war but the presence of such technologies deterred him. The longer the war lasted, the greater the damage was to German morale and military supplies and finally, the greater the chance of a German defeat. In essence, Chamberlain upheld and led the policy of appeasement to buy time for rearmament and allow economic recovery so that such technologies could be manufactured in time for the inevitable war with Hitler’s Germany. He knew that Britain was not ready in 1938 and now we know his efforts were not in vain.

Can someone clap for Chamberlain now please?

Up to this point, some historians still subscribe to the view that appeasement was not the only policy that could function against Nazi Germany. Anthony Eden claimed in his memoirs that appeasing the dictators was the misguided personal policy of Chamberlain which was vehemently opposed by some leading members of the cabinet.^[10] Winston Churchill also mentioned that appeasement, operating from the position of military weakness as it had under Chamberlain, was bound to fall apart. ^[9]

So, what pray tell is an alternative that would have done better or equivalent to that of Chamberlain’s policy.

First and foremost, appeasement was not a strategy Chamberlain created out of the blue. Neville Chamberlain followed suit with appeasement after his successor, reaffirming that at that time, Britain could not operate from the standpoint that they were the most formidable power in Europe, especially since Britain was not at all spared from the demise of the earlier war. Public opinion did not sway the slightest towards toiling for another war. Chamberlain’s foreign policy was an attempt to see if co-existence was possible; that it turned out not to be is no reason for condemning out of hand the only policy which promised any hope of avoiding war. ^[11] The fact that till a few months before he died, Hitler deeply regretted not choosing to go to war in September 1938 because it was the perfect time, showed that appeasement was largely successful in preventing German domination in the war.^[5]

Once again, the economic and military bearings in the 1930s did not give much room for Chamberlain to adopt hard measures against Hitler. Implementing economic and military sanctions were by no means a solution as Germany was already stacked with war reparations from the Versailles Treaty.^[1] This move would only infuriate Hitler further seeing as unfair conditions in the treaty were the original motivations for Hitler’s expansionist policy. Any attack on Germany’s economy or military would only backfire and hurt Britain. Additionally, although Chamberlain wanted to construct a grand alliance that had defeated the Kaiser in the First World War, he knew well enough that it was very unlikely and unrealistic. Glyn Stone mentions that the idea of a grand alliance had been in great scrutiny and was greatly pondered about. But it was impractical. Neither the US nor the USSR was willing to commit in an alliance: US was in isolation after WW1 and USSR was too busy severing her own heads. Appeasement was the only conceivable policy to tackle Hitler’s aggression specifically when Great Britain was not in any condition to get embroiled in another war, one that would only determine her destruction.

Whether or not war with Hitler was inevitable, it does not matter because, at the end of the day, Neville Chamberlain had secured sufficient time for the Allies to prepare, that in the end determined their victory.

References

^[1] From a speech by British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain to the 1900 Club (10 June 1936), reported in The Times (11 June 1936). The 1900 Club is a very prestigious London Club for wealthy and influential people; after the speech, they cheered Chamberlain ‘to the echo’.

^[2] Encyclopaedia Britannica. (2019, November 4). Munich Agreement. Retrieved December 16, 2019, from https://www.britannica.com/event/Munich-Agreement

^[3] By David Dutton. (2009, August 20). Neville Chamberlain should be praised, not buried. Retrieved from https://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/world-war-two/6062452/Neville-Chamberlain-should-be-praised-not-buried.html

^[4] Intelligence Squared. (2013, June 12). Neville Chamberlain did the right thing [Video file]. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fmyecSXOla8&t=2145s 

^[5] Robert Harris, H. (2017, October 9). The Munich Conference. History Extra Podcast [Available at various streaming platforms]. Retrieved from https://www.historyextra.com/period/second-world-war/the-munich-conference/

^[6] Postan, M. M. (1952). British War Production. Chapter II, Early Replacement, 1934-1938

^[7] McKinstry, L. (2007). Spitfire: Portrait of a Legend. p.6.  London, England: Hachette UK.

^[8] Barrett, Hughes, Jones, Nugus, & Oliphant. (2019). Greatest Events of WWII in Colour [Video file]. Retrieved from https://www.netflix.com/title/80989924

^[9] Winston Churchill (1949, February 28). The War Memoirs of Winston Churchill, Part IV.

^[10] Eden, A. (1977). Another World, 1897-1917. New York, NY: Doubleday Books.

^[11] Charmley, J. (1989). Chamberlain and the Lost Peace. In the Independent. Ivan R. Dee.